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Summary 
 The policy paper explores the rationale for investing in the so-called dual-use research 
and technology (R&T) to support Estonia’s national defence, civil security and public safety policy 
objectives. In addition, it investigates which areas of knowledge and technology generally have 
the greatest potential for an inter-agency approach and which of those areas are most relevant to 
Estonia’s defence, security and safety organisations. It also considers a variety of business models  
for pursuing the inter-agency approach to R&T and its application in Estonia. The paper finds that 
the application of comprehensive security and broad-based defence thinking leads to a high 
degree of overlap in the interests of defence, security and safety organisations. These interests 
can be translated into many similar needs in terms of new knowledge, technology and innovation. 
The inter-agency approach to addressing those needs helps to achieve greater synergy in results 
and to use limited resources in a more rational way, but the approach has not gained much 
recognition in Estonia just yet. The paper recommends a number of measures to facilitate better 
co-operation between Estonia’s defence, security and safety agencies (end-users) in exploiting the 
national and international science and technology base. The measures include: the drafting of a 
common new knowledge, technology and innovation agenda for the entire sector; partial 
integration of its implementation in the field of situational awareness and information 
management technologies (including cyber security) through a dedicated national research and 
development (R&D) programme; the formulation of common requirements by defence, security 
and safety organisations for some existing national programmes (e.g. health);  collaboration (e.g. 
in research on human and organisational factors, in the field of modelling and simulation 
technological know-how, in the development of inter-agency planning methodologies) between 
defence and security educational and training establishments; constant co-ordination of  R&T 
efforts in such fields as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRN-E) 
defence, unmanned systems and platforms, space technology and physical protection of 
personnel and infrastructure; and the maintenance of  a broad awareness of R&T needs, 
opportunities and activities by governmental, public and private stakeholders. 
 
Introduction  
1. In 2010, a working group led by the Estonian Ministry of Defence (MOD) was 
formed with the purpose of advancing inter-agency co-operation between national 
defence, civil security and safety organisations in the field of technology. It was partly 
inspired by a joint seminar organised by the International Centre for Defence Studies 
(ICDS), the Estonian Academy of Sciences and the MOD, and conducted in the margins of 
a NATO Research and Technology Board meeting in the autumn of 2010. The 
                                                 
1 Tomas Jermalavičius is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence Studies, co-ordinating the Centre’s 
‘Security, Strategy, Science and Technology’ theme; Mikk Lellsaar is a member of a training programme at the Estonian 
State Chancellery, assigned to the Estonian Ministry of Defence. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect the official position of the State Chancellery, the Ministry of Defence or any other governmental organisation. 
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expectation was to develop synergies in R&T investments made by Estonia’s national 
defence, civil security and safety organisations. However, there is no clear consensus on 
what should be done to make those synergies possible and on why and how it should be 
done. 
2. This policy paper has been drafted in response to an MOD’s knowledge 
requirement and aims to support the process of aligning the interests of national 
defence, civil security and safety organisations in R&T. It seeks to determine the main 
reasons for them to collaborate in R&T, to identify potential areas of focus and to 
propose a business model for such co-operation. It draws heavily on previous research 
performed by ICDS in the framework of its ‘Security, Strategy, Science and Technology’ 
theme, including a report on defence research and development in small NATO 
countries (Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands) published in 2009; a study on 
Estonian national security policies and their science and technology implications 
(encompassing the areas of cyber, energy and marine environment security, anti-
terrorism and crisis management) drafted for the EU-funded Crescendo consortium in 
2010; a report on Estonia’s defence research and development compiled in 2011; and a 
policy paper on Baltic collaboration in defence-related R&T written in 2012. 
3. In terms of methodology, we adopted a three-pronged approach in our research 
for this policy paper: 
3.1 First, we looked outside Estonia by performing desk research on various 
existing studies about co-operation and synergies between defence, civil 
security and safety in Europe and by reviewing, where possible, the approach of 
some individual countries. The rationale for this was simple: Estonia does not 
have to re-invent the wheel and can adapt many practices found elsewhere to 
suit its own needs.  
3.2 Second, we looked at the state of play in Estonia, which encompassed: 
(1) identifying instances where strategies and policies in national defence, civil 
security and safety require inter-agency co-operation; (2) reviewing institutional 
R&T policies and projects with the purpose of finding potential overlaps of 
interests; and (3) checking the record of actual co-operation in the two above-
mentioned domains. This included desk research on various Estonian policy 
documents and interviews with policymakers and experts from the MOD, the 
Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications (MEAC), the Ministry of Education and Research (MER), the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and their subordinate agencies (the Estonian Defence 
Forces (EDF), the Police and Border Guard Board, the Rescue Board, the Estonian 
Internal Security Service, the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences (EASS), the 
Maritime Administration, the Civil Aviation Administration, the MOI Information 
Technology and Development Centre (SMIT), the Estonian Information System’s 
Authority, Enterprise Estonia and the Tax and Customs Board).2  
3.3 Third, we sought to harness expert perspectives on R&T and on specific 
areas of potential co-operation through a survey questionnaire and a dedicated 
workshop conducted together with the EASS. This served as a tool to validate 
                                                 
2 To be truly comprehensive in our approach, we should have also included other governmental stakeholders whose 
policies and capabilities influence civil security and public safety: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which, for example, co-
ordinates Estonia’s participation in civilian crisis management operations abroad); the Ministry of Justice (and its Prisons 
Service); the Ministry of Social Affairs (the Health Board is involved in disease and pandemic prevention and response); 
the Ministry of the Environment (the Environmental Board and the Environmental Inspectorate are involved in 
environmental emergency prevention and response) and even the Ministry of Agriculture (responsible for food safety and 
veterinary emergency management). Time limits, however, did not allow us to do that. Future efforts to define dual-use 
R&T potential, policies and mechanisms should include these organisations. 
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and refine our recommendations flowing from the previous two strands of 
research. 
4. Our research relied on open sources, which inevitably prevented us from 
developing insights about inter-agency co-operation in R&T based on classified 
programmes and plans. In addition, we concentrated on end-user perspectives and 
steered away from supply-side considerations, even though it should be acknowledged 
that effective R&T policy-making emerges through dialogue between the two sides. 
However, at this point, we thought it necessary to help end-users sharpen their thinking 
about their own requirements and co-operation opportunities before engaging the 
supply side and exploring ‘the art of the possible’ with it.  
5. Our workshop results should not be expected to cover all aspects of the topic at 
hand. The workshop included both generalists – capability, technology and acquisition 
planners – and specialists in particular technologies. The latter group could not possibly 
encompass all areas of R&T pertinent to national defence, civil security and public 
safety. Therefore, it is inevitable that some potential co-operation areas were omitted, 
even though every effort was made with the survey questionnaire and in desk research 
to address this shortcoming. The workshop was immensely useful, however, for 
capturing the insights of a diverse multi-agency and multi-disciplinary audience. 
6. The paper is divided into four main chapters, each incorporating our findings 
from all three prongs of research: the first chapter deals with terminology; the second 
chapter addresses the rationale for an inter-agency approach to R&T; the third chapter 
zooms in on more specific knowledge and technology domains where the inter-agency 
approach is necessary and could succeed; and the fourth chapter considers possible 
business models for pursuing the inter-agency approach. The paper ends with 
conclusions and recommendations on how and in what areas Estonia could seek to build 
synergy in R&T investments for national defence, civil security and public safety sectors. 
7. We would like to thank all Estonian and foreign experts and decision-makers 
who made themselves available to share their knowledge and perspectives with us. We 
are also very grateful to our colleagues at ICDS and the MOD for their valuable 
comments on drafts of this paper. 
 
I. Terminology issues 
8. The departure point for our enquiry into the subject of this paper was the term 
‘dual-use technology’. We found it somewhat deficient in two respects: 
8.1 ‘Dual-use’ is more commonly employed to refer to technologies that 
generally have peaceful civilian uses but could also be adapted by potential 
adversaries to serve their military or security objectives.3 Thus, ‘dual-use’ has a 
connotation of benign and hostile uses of technology, which is certainly not the 
meaning we have in mind. Accordingly, this is a term often encountered in the 
context of exports control. As a result, for example, in Ireland the term ‘dual-
use’ is not used to describe the subject of civil-military co-operation in 
developing new technologies.4 On the other hand, the term is increasingly 
popular and widely used in debates at the European level, exactly with the dual 
                                                 
3 An excellent example of ‘dual-use’ technology in this meaning is Iran’s expertise in concrete that increases the resilience 
of buildings during earthquakes, but which is now being put to use to enhance the protection of underground facilities 
that house elements of Iran’s nuclear programme against the threat of bunker-busting bombs. See “Smart Concrete,” The 
Economist, 3 March 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21548918. 
4 Telephone interview with Michael Murphy, Enterprise Ireland, 24 January 2013. 
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– civil security and military – use in mind.5 For the latter reason and for want of a 
better term, we adopt the ‘dual-use’ label, but with the understanding that it 
denotes technology that can be employed both by civilian – security or safety – 
and military users for the benefit of civil security, public safety and national 
defence. 
8.2 We are convinced that ‘technology’ must go hand in hand with 
‘research’ or, to borrow a part of the definition of ‘research and development’ 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with 
‘creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge’.6 This expands considerably the scope of possible co-operation 
opportunities between civil security, safety and defence organisations. We 
therefore prefer to use the term ‘research and technology’ (R&T) instead of just 
‘technology’ in our paper. Within the ‘research’ part, we highlight in particular 
applied research7 projects, addressing the knowledge needs of various civil 
security, safety and defence organisations. This lays the ground for experimental 
development of new technology and the subsequent introduction of new 
applications (products or services), but with more specific capability 
requirements for different agencies as a driving force. (Indeed, it is suggested 
that the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 3, i.e. the ‛proof of concept’, is the 
level beyond which technology becomes more specific in terms of its application 
– be it civil security or military.)8  
9. We view the scopes of both ‘research’ and ‘technology’ in a broad sense. 
Research encompasses social sciences and humanities as well as natural sciences and 
engineering; technology is understood not only as components of ‘hardware’ 
(equipment and devices), but also as methods and processes (including those related to 
the human dimension, not only materiel).9 Again, this broadens the number of co-
operation areas and opportunities for civil security, safety and defence stakeholders.  
10. It must be noted, however, that when it comes to ‘dual-use’, most studies – 
especially EU-funded – narrowly focus on technical R&T, even though EU research 
programmes (e.g. the Security Research Theme of the Framework Programme) also 
include research in social sciences (e.g. topics related to behavioural studies, 
organisational management, etc.). Judging from our interviews with experts and 
policymakers as well as from the findings of previous ICDS studies, Estonian end-users 
are similarly technically-minded and, to a degree, hardware-oriented in their 
understanding of R&T and its expected outcomes. The workshop, however, revealed 
that the so-called ‘soft’ aspects (human factors, decision-making, organisational 
management, resource and capability planning methodologies, etc.) are also considered 
by the Estonian end-users to be perfectly legitimate fields of research. 
11. When speaking about common investments in R&T by civil security, safety and 
defence organisations, one of the key terms is ‘co-operation’. There is an entire 
spectrum of possible forms of interaction between organisations from avoidance and 
                                                 
5 For instance, the European Space Conference 2013 included a session entitled ‘Security, Defence and the “Code of 
Conduct” for Outer Space Activities: The Dual Use of EU Space Programmes and European Space Activities’. 
6 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for 
Surveys on Research and Experimental Development, Paris: OECD Publications Service, 2002, p. 30, 
http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/9202081e.pdf. 
7 Defined as ‘original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily 
towards a specific practical aim or objective’ (OECD, 2002, p. 30). 
8 French Ministry of Defence, “Informal Paper: Proposal for Dual-Use – Civil and Defence – Issues to Be Proposed for the 
Inclusion in the European Commission’s Forthcoming Research and Innovation Programme,” 2011. 
9 For a more detailed elaboration of definitions, see Tomas Jermalavičius, Estonian Defence Research and Development: 
Lessons from the Past, Outlook for the Future, ICDS Report, Tallinn, 2011, pp. 11–12, 
http://icds.ee/fileadmin/failid/ICDS_Report-Estonia_s_Defence_R_D-September_2011.pdf. 
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competition to communication (information sharing, awareness enhancement) and co-
ordination (the de-conflicting or harmonisation of policies and activities) and then to 
collaboration and partial or full integration. Co-operation encompasses communication, 
co-ordination, collaboration and integration (see a chart below) which we see as 
distinct, though overlapping, forms of interaction. 
 Figure 1: Continuum of co-operation modes 
12. The nature of preferred (or practiced) forms of interaction very much 
determines the areas and methods of R&T co-operation for various agencies. For 
instance, if the ambition is only to enhance awareness about what is being done by 
different agencies, then regular meetings, databases and newsletters are more than 
enough. The co-ordination of R&T investments across defence, civil security and safety 
sectors may already require such tools as cross-roadmap reviews of common technology 
needs.10 Integration presumes such elements as joint planning, feedback and review, 
common technology roadmaps, common funding, project management and result-
sharing mechanisms (beyond R&T – also joint procurement and maintenance). 
12.1 At the European level, for instance, current discussions and agreements 
(e.g. the European Framework Co-operation for Security and Defence) focus on 
‘co-ordination’ and, to some degree, on ‘collaboration’ to ensure that military 
end-users could benefit from R&T conducted under the auspices of the 
European Commission (EC) and the European Space Agency (ESA), and vice 
versa, i.e. that civil security and safety end-users could benefit from military R&T 
run by the European Defence Agency (EDA). This level of ambition is pre-
determined by a complex institutional structure at the European level, which 
makes an integrated civil-military approach in the EC-EDA-ESA triangle very 
difficult. The same consideration, however, is not, or should not be, so salient at 
national level, especially in a small country. 
13. The aspiration to pursue ‘dual-use’ R&T implies that there is, among other 
things, a wish and a need for synergies in developing new knowledge and technology for 
civil security, safety and defence organisations. ‘Synergy’ is one of the most frequently 
used terms in the debate on ‘dual-use’ and its rationale.11 In the civil-military context it 
means ‘a greater effectiveness or efficiency, achieved through combined actions or co-
operation between the civil security and the military sectors than would or could be 
achieved separately’.12 In practice synergy often comes in a particular form – spin-offs 
and spin-ins – defined as ‘the application of a technology developed primarily for one 
sector in the other sector’.13 This definition suggests that, in practice, much of the 
technology development across Europe still takes place in the stovepipe of civil security 
and defence, but both sides are increasingly eager to capture the results of the other 
side’s R&T investments and apply them to meet their own capability requirements. 
 
                                                 
10 See Ronald N. Kostoff and Robert R. Schaller, “Science and Technology Roadmaps,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, Vol. 48, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 132–143. 
11 In a NATO context, the term ‘multiplier effect’ is more popular, but its meaning is similar to that of ‘synergy’. 
12 Ecorys Netherlands, Study on Civil Military Synergies in the Field of Security, Final Report for the European Commission 
DG Enterprise & Industry, Rotterdam, 2012, p. 23, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/study_ecorys_cimisos_final_report_en.pdf.  
13 Ibid. 
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II. Rationale for an inter-agency approach to R&T and the current 
state of play 
14. The security studies literature is in agreement that the distinction between 
external and internal security of nation-states has become blurred due to the rise of 
transnational security issues. Threats arising far from national borders may eventually 
come to affect internal security, while internal security issues tend to spill over to other 
countries.14 There are also a number of security threats that cut across many 
theoretically distinct security sectors (i.e. political, military, economic, societal and 
environmental).15 Threats originating in one sector may have profound implications for 
other sectors. Examples of such threats are terrorism and insurgency, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), state failure and internal armed conflicts, 
organised crime, human trafficking, the disruption of critical infrastructure and services 
(e.g. through cyber attacks or energy supply disruption), climate change and even 
wildlife crime.16  
15.    The above consensus about the nature of contemporary security threats is well-
reflected in the strategic documents of Estonia, the EU and NATO. It is stated in the 2010 
National Security Concept of Estonia that ‘the impact of political confrontation, 
economic disputes, competition for resources, religious and ethnic tensions, failed 
states and non-state actors is often global. Globalisation brings along the entwinement 
and rapid proliferation of security threats.’17 The 2003 European Security Strategy 
maintains that ‘the post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in 
which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’ and that ‘in 
an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near 
at hand.’18 It is also stressed in the NATO Science and Technology Strategy that ‘the line 
between defence and security is blurring. Indeed the same threats are being 
encountered in domestic security and external operations, for example Improvised 
Explosive Devices and cyber attacks.’19 
16. The probability of a conventional (inter-state) armed conflict is often regarded 
as low in the post-Cold War era. However, it cannot be entirely discarded. According to 
Colin S. Gray, ‘there will be wars between states […] because they will have a great deal 
about which to fight.’20 This observation is valid for the Nordic-Baltic region where 
Russia’s military modernisation, military activities and political hostility are viewed with 
growing concern. It is stated in the Estonian National Defence Strategy that ‘a direct 
military attack against Estonia is unlikely; however, such a threat cannot be ruled out 
altogether.’21 Conventional armed conflicts, just as soft security threats, also reverberate 
across multiple sectors in terms of their impact. They are not purely military issues that 
must be dealt with, but also cause disruption and insecurity in the political, societal, 
economic and environmental spheres. 
                                                 
14 See Derek Lutterbeck, “Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and External Security in Western 
Europe,” European Security, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2005, pp. 231–253. 
15 For a discussion of threats in distinct sectors of security, see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, Harlow: Pearson 
Education Ltd, 1991, pp. 116–134. 
16 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has recently linked rampant wildlife trafficking with the funding of civil wars, 
insurgency, terrorism and state destabilisation in sub-Saharan Africa. See WWF, “Fighting Illicit Wildlife Trafficking,” 
December 2012, http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwffightingillicitwildlifetrafficking_lr.pdf. 
17 Riigikogu, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” 12 May 2010, p. 5, 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf.  
18 Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” 2003, pp. 2 & 7, 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
19 NATO Science and Technology Board, “NATO Science and Technology Strategy,” 2012, p. 6. 
20 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, p. 178. 
21 Estonian Ministry of Defence, “National Defence Strategy,” February 2011, p. 7, 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng(2).pdf. 
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17. In a similar vein, international intervention and conflict management (or ‘out-of-
area’ operations in NATO’s jargon) are not limited to the military domain. Experience 
from the campaigns in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan amply demonstrates that the 
addressing of root causes in the political, economic and societal spheres plays an even 
more crucial role in reaching sustainable long-term resolutions. According to the NATO 
Strategic Concept, ‘the lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in 
Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, 
civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.’22 
18. It is therefore obvious that effective solutions to national security challenges 
cannot come from separate organisations or even nations. This applies equally to the 
activities at the stages of threat prevention, active counter-activities and the 
management of their consequences. The same logic also extends to complex 
emergencies or crises, to wars and to operations on home soil and abroad. National 
agencies responsible for managing various security aspects have to reach out beyond 
their organisational and national boundaries in order to succeed. Concerted efforts by 
governmental, non-governmental (including the private sector and the academia), inter-
governmental and supra-national actors are often the key to resolving national, regional 
and global security issues. This underlying philosophy is labelled in security studies as 
‘comprehensive security’;23 in ‘out-of-area’ crisis management it is commonly referred 
to as the ‘comprehensive approach’;24 and in Estonia’s homeland defence discourse it is 
known as ‘broad-based defence’.25  
19. Even when the management of a security situation falls within the area of 
responsibility of a particular organisation, its resources might not be sufficient to cope 
with adverse circumstances. This necessitates the marshalling of the resources of other 
organisations – be they governmental, public or private, foreign (allied) or national. This 
whole-of-government, whole-of-society and whole-of-alliance imperative is particularly 
strong in small states, both in the case of large-scale emergencies or crises and in 
wartime. In this regard, there must be a leading agency that has to have assured access 
to resources, capabilities and services of other organisations and to act as an intelligent 
customer for those organisations: a necessary degree of technical, organisational and 
human interoperability as well as familiarity with those organisations and their 
capabilities must be achieved.26 
20. A paramount implication of all this is that the tasks of various security and 
defence organisations have become convergent, with the armed forces having to 
perform some roles of the civil security sector and vice versa. According to an EU-funded 
study, this is not the case at the higher (i.e. war-fighting) and the lower (i.e. law 
enforcement and policing) ends of the mission spectrum, but the trend is very strong 
between these two extremities – it covers crisis management and peace support 
                                                 
22 North Atlantic Council, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010, p. 19, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.  
23 See Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara, “Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures – How 
Comprehensive Can We Get?” Strategic Studies Working Group Papers, March 2012, 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Comprehensive%20Security%20Requires%20Comprehensive%20Structures.pdf. 
24 See Crisis Management Initiative, Kristiina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, “Comprehensive Approach: Trends, Challenges 
and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management,” Seminar Publication, Helsinki: Ministry of 
Defence, 2008, http://www.defmin.fi/files/1316/Comprehensive_Approach_-
_Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_Cooperation_in_Crisis_Prevention_and_Management.pdf. 
25 See Estonian Ministry of Defence, February 2011. 
26 See Michael Hallett and Oke Thorngren, “Attempting a Comprehensive Approach Definition and Its Implications for 
Reconceptualizing Capability Development” in Derrick J. Neal and Linton Wells II (eds.), Capability Development in Support 
of Comprehensive Approaches: Transforming International Civil-Military Interactions, Washington: NDU Press, 2011, pp. 
35–50, http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/142718/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f6211158-d4b8-
4e9b-ae68-c719f6e3a404/en/full+text.pdf; Luc van de Goor and Claudia Major, “How to Make the Comprehensive 
Approach Work?” CPU Policy Brief, No. 21, March 2012, 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2012/20120404_cru_policy_brief_21.pdf.  
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operations, the fight against terrorism, border protection, counter-piracy, non-
proliferation, responses to natural and industrial disasters, critical infrastructure 
protection, etc.27 The same report identifies functions that are shared by agencies 
involved in high-end security and in defence: (1) detection, identification and 
authentication (e.g. of vessels, aircraft and individuals); (2) situational awareness, 
including surveillance (from multiple sources); (3) risk assessment, modelling and impact 
reduction; (4) communication; (5) information management; and (6) positioning and 
localisation.28  
21. The blurring of tasks and the sharing of functions mean that military and civil 
security organisations have a degree of common interest in similar areas of knowledge 
and technology, even though the applications derived from those areas may differ. 
(After all, knowledge and technology are not inherently military or inherently civil 
security-related, only their applications are.)29 Even when the nature of missions is 
divergent, the same equipment and systems could be employed to support military or 
civil security tasks – either with some customisation or, indeed, without any major 
modifications (space technology and unmanned aerial systems (UASs) are prime 
examples of such dual use). In some cases, technology (e.g. communications) serves as a 
key enabler for inter-agency interaction in managing security threats.  
22. While interests are shared, their realisation through R&T and capability 
programmes is often still stovepiped. At the European level, for instance, R&T projects 
of relevance to both military and civil security end-users have been run separately by 
the EC Framework Programme (Security Theme), EDA and ESA. A similar picture 
emerged, and often continues to emerge, at national level. According to a TNO (Dutch 
Applied Research Organisation) study, ‘while the mutual interests and capability 
deployments in the defence and security sectors are increasingly converging, the 
development of common research agendas and programmes is still haphazard.’30 All this 
leads to duplication, lack of critical mass and impact as well as financial inefficiency.  In 
times of budgetary austerity, however, financial pressure is becoming a significant 
driving force for pooling R&T investments and sharing their results between civil security 
and military organisations. As pointed out by Krzysztof Lisek, a member of the European 
Parliament, ‘the growing impact of the financial crisis in Europe means there is a 
growing need to hike the complementarities between security and defence.’31 
23. The overall trend dictated by strategic and financial imperatives is towards a 
stronger inter-agency/inter-organisational approach in security and defence R&T. At the 
European level, the EU Commission and EDA build closer links between their research 
agendas within the European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence, while 
EDA and ESA work together on a number of areas of common interest based on an 
administrative arrangement32 (see Chapter III for particular co-operation areas). The 
                                                 
27 See Istituto Affari Internatzionali (IAI), Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and Insitut de Relations 
Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), “Study on the Industrial Implications in Europe of the Blurring of Dividing Lines 
between Security and Defence,” Final Report, June 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/new_defsec_final_report_en.pdf. 
28 Ibid, pp. 53–61. 
29 Ecorys Netherlands, p. 24. 
30 TNO, “Development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base,” Final Report, 2009, p. 146, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/edem_final_report_en.pdf. 
31 European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, “EU, National and Industry Officials Mull How to Promote Stronger 
R&D Links between Civil Security and Defence Sectors,” News, March 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=6511&lang=en. 
32 See “European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence Research,” EDA Factsheet, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede301109factsheetefcsecuritydefence_/se
de301109factsheetefcsecuritydefence_en.pdf; European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, “European Framework 
Cooperation in the Field of Research,” News, 20 September 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=5413&lang=en; and “EDA & Space,” EDA 
Factsheet, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_-Defence_space_final.pdf. 
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practice of defining common knowledge, technology and capability needs is taking root 
at national level in various countries: the Netherlands,33 the United Kingdom,34 
Slovenia,35 Poland36 and Canada across the Atlantic.37 Even in countries where traditions 
and long-standing policies previously dictated a strict separation of military and civil 
security activities (e.g. Ireland)38 or the dominance of one sector over the other (e.g. the 
military sector, as in Finland),39 there is a clear trend towards a stronger inter-agency 
approach to R&T.  
24.   In Estonia, the need for an inter-agency approach to tackle a range of security 
challenges is well-appreciated at the policy level. The National Security Concept calls for 
the improvement of ‘joint planning for situations which require efficient co-operation 
between state authorities and other parties. This requires clarity in management and 
planning, prompt decision-making, specified competencies of state authorities as well as 
their readiness to draw on the capabilities and resources regardless of their affiliation.’40 
It is clearly stated in various sectoral strategies and policies, such as the Cyber Security 
Strategy, the Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Security Policy until 2015 (an internal security 
policy document), the National Defence Strategy, the Emergencies Act and the 
Fundamentals of Counter-Terrorism in Estonia, that the threats and risks that they 
address are not matters to be dealt with by a single organisation. Comprehensive 
security and broad-based defence, enshrined in Estonian strategic thinking, constitute 
an unassailable strategic rationale for governmental agencies in civil security, public 
safety and national defence to work together in fulfilling their functions. 
25. In practice, as our research and workshop revealed, the picture is mixed. On the 
one hand, there are many positive common activities such as mutual involvement in 
exercises and operations, the exchange of information and mutual support with 
capabilities: 
25.1 Cyber security is perceived as a veritable success story from highly 
effective inter-agency and public-private defence actions against the 2007 
cyber-attacks to current routine interactions (e.g. exercises and simulations), 
involving military, civil security, public research and private organisations; 
 
25.2 Civilian agencies successfully participate in military-run host nation 
support exercises (e.g. Baltic Host) and, vice versa, military personnel take part 
in crisis management/emergency response exercises run by civilian authorities. 
Police authorities routinely use the modelling and simulation capabilities of the 
military; 
 
                                                 
33 See Pieter J. Keuning, “R&T for Defence, Security and Safety: Experiences from the Netherlands,” Seminar Presentation, 
Tallinn: Academy of Sciences, 20 September 2010, http://icds.ee/fileadmin/events/2010-09-20-
interagency/Pieter%20J%20Keuning-Director%20R%26D-Netherlands%20MOD.pdf. 
34 See UK Ministry of Defence, “National Security through Technology: Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK 
Defence and Security,” White Paper, London: The Stationary Office Limited, February 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27390/cm8278.pdf. 
35 E-mail interview with Davor Kozmus, Slovenian Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports, 15 January 2013. 
36 Marek Kalbarczyk, “Polish Defence and Security R&T System: Structures, Financing, Projects, Lessons Learned,” Seminar 
Presentation, Tallinn: Academy of Sciences, 20 September 2010, http://icds.ee/fileadmin/events/2010-09-20-
interagency/Col%20Marek%20Kalbarczyk-NATO%20RTO%20coordinator-Polish%20MOND.pdf. 
37 Robert Walker, “Interagency Approach to R&T for Defence, Security and Safety: NATO and Canadian Perspectives,” 
Seminar Presentation, Tallinn: Academy of Sciences, 20 September 2010, http://icds.ee/fileadmin/events/2010-09-20-
interagency/Dr%20Robert%20Walker-Chairman-NATO%20RTB.pdf. 
38 Telephone interview with Michael Murphy, Enterprise Ireland, 21 January 2013. 
39 Mika Hyytiäinen, “Dual Use in R&D: Some Finnish Experiences,” Workshop Presentation, Tallinn: Academy of Security 
Sciences, 21 February 2013. 
40 Riigikogu, p. 9. 
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25.3 Radar data from the network of civilian radars is used by the military for 
their air surveillance tasks. There is also co-operation between the military and 
the border guard in maritime and air surveillance; 
 
25.4 Assets of the EDF (e.g. pioneer equipment, logistics trucks, boats and 
helicopters) and the National Defence League are often deployed to assist 
civilian authorities in rescue/emergency response operations (e.g. fighting forest 
fires and responding to floods); 
 
25.5 There have been several instances of co-operation that have 
demonstrated that civilian and military authorities can respond to the 
operational needs of each other and are able to act together when necessary 
(e.g. the response to the 2007 riots and public disturbances; security operations 
related to a NATO ministerial meeting and the delivery of euro notes to Estonia; 
an operation involving a cargo airplane that crash-landed on a lake in Tallinn; 
and the evacuation of hundreds of people stranded on a highway during a 
severe snow storm– all in 2010). 
26. On the other hand, capability planning and development are still very much 
stovepiped in various agencies, despite some tentative efforts to broaden the number of 
external stakeholders. For instance, when the latest ten-year National Defence 
Development Plan (2013–2022) was prepared – which was done well in the spirit of 
broad-based defence – civilian agencies did participate, but only in the initial stages. 
Later on, differences in their approach to capability planning, the lack of a common 
methodology and other factors led to back to the defence/military stovepipe.  
(Conversely, civilian agencies such as the Police and Border Guard Board and the Rescue 
Board hardly ever involve the military in their capability planning processes.) Indeed, 
security and defence agencies have very limited awareness of each other‘s needs, plans, 
priorities and ways of implementing them. There is no culture or established practices or 
processes for integrated (inter-agency) capability planning – or at least for co-ordination 
and harmonisation – to ensure that unnecessary duplication (or capability gaps) is 
avoided and a high degree of inter-agency interoperability is achieved.41 
27. In general, it is thought that ‘some segments of the security sector are 
characterised by weak demand side capacity to identify their capability requirements 
and/or to understand the capabilities that a particular technology can deliver or to 
recognise the benefits of innovative approaches.’42 In Estonia, this observation rings true 
not only in relation to civil security organisations but to defence end-users as well.43 It is 
therefore difficult to expect the two groups of end-users – military and civilian –  to 
come together for joint capability planning, technology roadmapping and innovation 
(thus creating a demand-side pull for R&T), while both groups have their own difficulties 
in this area. On the other hand, this opens opportunities for joint building of necessary 
competence and capacities (e.g. in technology management, planning methodologies 
and innovation management). 
28. Nonetheless, instances of inter-agency interaction at the stage of national 
security and defence capability development are already emerging not only in 
                                                 
41 A reasonable argument can be made that, in terms of resources, domestic inter-agency co-operation often competes 
with international (military-to-military, security-to-security) co-operation that involves the fulfilment of EU and NATO 
benchmarks and collective requirements (the latter form of co-operation is easier because it engages similar 
organisations from different nations). Inevitably, a small administrative apparatus (i.e. an agency) frequently gives priority 
to international co-operation. The true art of comprehensive security and broad-based defence is to achieve a situation 
where the international (whole-of-alliance) and domestic inter-agency (whole-of-government) dimensions effectively 
supplement each other. 
42 ECORYS, p. 87. 
43 See Jermalavičius, pp. 50–51. 
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operational sharing and mutual support, e.g. the EDF’s (more specifically, the Navy’s) 
participation in the development of a maritime surveillance system, led by civilian 
authorities. The new Estonian Defence Industrial Policy 2013–2022, unveiled by the 
Estonian MOD in February 2013, envisages the MOD’s, the MOI’s and their subordinate 
agencies’ co-ordinated input into the development of new technology, products and 
services by the Estonian industry.44 Thus industry initiatives might open the gates for 
progress in adopting the inter-agency approach also to capability planning and 
development because governmental organisations will have to respond to those 
initiatives in a co-ordinated manner.  
29. By extension, a similar situation in terms of inter-agency interaction emerges in 
the field of R&T, which is further aggravated by R&T-specific issues: 
29.1 Among the ministries and agencies that are of key interest to us, only 
the MOD has an institutional (and by now long-standing) R&T strategy, a 
dedicated budget for its implementation45 and a central co-ordinating authority. 
Indeed, the MOD puts a strong emphasis on the dual-use principle during the 
implementation of the strategy.46 The MOD processes for the definition of R&T 
needs and for project launching, however, do not include specific points for 
informing, consulting or co-ordinating with other ministries or civil security and 
safety agencies (with the exception of co-ordination with the MER and the 
Estonian Research Council on competence-building projects with universities). If 
information is exchanged or consultations conducted, it is mostly done on an ad 
hoc basis.47 
    
29.2 The MOI has a fairly rudimentary policy which encourages private 
companies to demonstrate their ideas, but they have to bear project costs and 
risks themselves, while the MOI tests and evaluates results and provides 
feedback. The EASS, however, adopted its research and development strategy in 
March 2013 which is as close to an institutional R&T strategy for the MOI’s 
entire area of government as it gets. The strategy also captures the knowledge 
and skill requirements for the agencies under the MOF (the Tax and Customs 
Board) and the Ministry of Justice (the Estonian Forensic Science Institute and 
the Prisons Service). 
 
29.3 Our survey suggests that most civil security and safety agencies 
subordinated to the MOI or the MEAC do not have their own R&T strategies and 
they allocate assets for this field only on an ad hoc basis (often without any co-
ordination between themselves, let alone with the military).48 Accordingly, the 
R&T culture is underdeveloped and the same applies to deep expertise and 
structured processes for the definition, harmonisation and implementation of 
R&T requirements (which is quite typical of many civil security agencies across 
Europe).49 
 
                                                 
44 See Estonian Ministry of Defence, “Defence Industrial Policy 2013–2022” (in Estonian), February 2013, 
http://www.kmin.ee/files/kmin/img/files/Eesti_kaitsetoostuspoliitika_2013-2022.pdf. 
45 It falls considerably short of the NATO and EU target of 2% of defence costs: as of 2012, spending was at the level of 
0.37% (although not all R&T activities performed by defence organisations are reflected in the defence investments area, 
so the actual figure is somewhat higher). 
46 For instance, the dual-use principle guides the decisions on participation in the R&T projects of the EDA. See Ministry of 
Defence, “Principles of Participation in Research and Technology Activities of the European Defence Agency” (in 
Estonian), Minister’s Decree No. 332, 1 November 2012.  
47 For example, the MOD consulted with the Rescue Board’s demining experts on their knowledge requirements when it 
started to participate in the EDA project which included research in the field of munitions toxicology. 
48 For this reason, it is impossible to provide a clear figure on how much the MOI and the MEAC spend on security and 
safety-related R&T on a year-to-year basis. 
49 See IAI, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and IRIS, pp. 107–109. 
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29.4 None of the organisations covered in this paper view R&T as a matter of 
strategic importance, unlike, for instance, the UK government which regards it 
as a means to avoid strategic surprise, to enable the adoption of an intelligent 
customer posture, to retain technological advantage and to maintain strategic 
and operational sovereignty.50 However, our survey reveals that Estonian 
organisations still considered R&T to be crucial in at least two fundamental 
respects (a perception that is not really backed by policies and funding 
commitments): (a) for the acquisition of new knowledge and increasing their 
organisational competence; and (b) for the enhancement of existing capabilities, 
the acquisition of new ones and the prevention of their obsolescence. The 
significance of R&T is also underlined in the new Estonian Defence Industrial 
Policy 2013–2022.  
30. Even in this disjointed environment characterised by R&T’s undeservedly 
marginal role, there have been quite a few dual-use R&T projects, implemented by the 
defence side or by the civil security side (sometimes duplicating one another) or 
conducted under enterprise support schemes run by Enterprise Estonia. In some cases, 
the results produced successful spin-offs from the defence sector to the civil security 
side. Furthermore, there are projects that are being launched with extensive 
participation by civil security, safety and defence stakeholders (e.g. the BIAS LIFE project 
on underwater acoustics monitoring). However, as one workshop participant noted, 
‘there is a clear recognition both at the political and the expert levels that an inter-
agency approach to R&T is necessary; yet something happens to this goodwill between 
the two levels.’ 
31. The situation should be greatly facilitated by a fact that almost all governmental 
organisations involved in civil security, public safety and defence draw upon a common 
R&T supply base – Estonian civilian universities, research centres and enterprises – as 
opposed to their own in-house research establishments (with the exception of some 
research carried out at the EASS and the Estonian National Defence College (ENDC), but 
even these research efforts are often linked with competences and activities at civilian 
universities). The exploitation of the same supply base means – at least in theory – that: 
(a) military and civil security applications are derived from the same sources of national 
expertise (the same people, and their networks, who do not specialise solely in military 
or solely in civil security R&T) and (b) the range of these applications will always reflect 
(and will be constrained by) the underlying strengths of the Estonian civilian R&T sector 
in particular areas of knowledge and technology.  
32. It is unclear whether or not the demand side will be able to organise itself in 
order to sustain, strengthen and harness this common base in a co-ordinated, effective 
and efficient manner. A similar question – will the end-users be able to organise 
themselves properly and ‘pool’ their demand? – arises in cases where they cannot draw 
upon national expertise (due to its absence) and need to contract foreign R&T 
suppliers.51 The answer largely depends on whether or not the end-users manage to 
identify the areas in which they have shared interests (which is the subject of the next 
chapter) and whether or not they deploy suitable mechanisms to pursue these interests  
nationally or internationally (which is discussed in Chapter IV). 
 
 
                                                 
50 See UK Ministry of Defence, pp. 26–28 & 34.  
51 Indeed, mechanisms for tapping into the knowledge and technology base of foreign allies and partners are crucial – 
they should receive much more attention, given that Estonian experts cannot possibly cover in-depth all key areas in 
national defence, civil security and public safety. End-users should remain open-minded about the sources of supply, 
instead of regarding Estonian R&T organisations as their exclusive demand-side partners. 
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III. Potential areas for dual-use R&T 
33. The success of the inter-agency approach to R&T partly hinges on the 
achievement of a consensus between defence, civil security and public safety 
stakeholders regarding the areas of focus.52 We combined several methods to 
determine the potential breadth of dual-use R&T in Estonia. Each of the following 
thrusts has various limitations if taken individually, but their combinations allowed us to 
develop a reasonably comprehensive picture of which R&T areas could be regarded as 
candidates for inter-agency measures by Estonian defence, civil security and safety 
organisations. Our activities were the following: 
 We examined the findings of various EU-funded studies about dual-use R&T 
trends in Europe; 
 We looked into the agenda of co-operation between the EC, EDA and ESA 
and examined NATO’s R&T priority objectives; 
 We considered national dual-use R&T agendas and experiences in various 
EU and NATO countries; 
 We extracted clues about R&T areas of relevance from Estonian national 
security and defence policy documents; 
 We reviewed past and present dual-use R&T investments/projects in 
Estonia; 
 We examined the very few existing institutional R&T strategies and policies 
in the civil security and national defence sectors; 
 We captured national expert perspectives through interviews, a survey 
questionnaire and a workshop. 
34. The study on the industrial implications of the blurring of dividing lines between 
security and defence has identified the following technologies on which the interests of 
military and civil security end-users coincide (and which are indeed the technological 
drivers for blurring): 
 Structural materials/technologies and structural effects analysis, with an 
underlying shared interest for military, civil security and safety end-users in 
strengthening physical installations against the impact of explosions; 
 
 Photonic/optical materials and device technology, given their numerous 
applications in infra-red (IR) sensors, navigation, search and rescue, mine 
laying/detection and Command and Control; 
 
 Sensor (esp. hyperspectral/multispectral, IR, acoustic and optical) 
technology and components, driven by shared civil-military interest in their 
application for border/area/point surveillance, CBRN-E substances 
detection, etc.; 
 
 Electronic components as a generic technology with multiple applications 
across the civil security and defence sectors; 
 
 Signal processing, information, computing and communication technologies, 
which are critical for interoperability in comprehensive security and broad-
based defence missions; 
 
                                                 
52 Raffaele Esposito, “Interagency Research and Technology Strategy for Defence, Security and Safety: The Industrial Point 
of View on Problems and Opportunities,” Seminar Presentation, Tallinn: Academy of Sciences, 20 September 2010, 
http://icds.ee/fileadmin/events/2010-09-20-interagency/Dr%20Raffaele%20Esposito-Honorary%20Chairman-NIAG.pdf. 
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 Information security technologies, which are crucial in protecting both 
civilian and military networks; 
 
 Simulation tools and software, particularly those applied in tactical/crew 
training systems, command and staff training systems and synthetic 
environments. Military, civil security and safety end-users increasingly rely 
on such tools to cut their training costs; 
 
 Human sciences, particularly technologies that can be applied for human 
behaviour analysis and modelling, which are relevant to both civil security 
(e.g. in anti-terrorism, riot control and other functions) and military (e.g. in 
peace support operations) organisations; 
 
 Biotechnology, especially technologies that allow for the rapid analysis of 
biological agents and of human susceptibility to diseases and toxicants, 
decontamination techniques, water testing and purification techniques – all 
of which are essential for military operations in hostile areas and for the 
protection of civilian populations.53 
35. The same study also outlines a number of emerging technologies which will be 
additional drivers for blurring between civil security and military functions and which 
will be exploited by civil security, safety and defence organisations. These are 
concentrated in the fields of nanomaterials (for applications in CBRN-E detection, force 
protection, computing, imaging, etc.) and nanotechnologies; communications 
(wired/wireless, secure, etc.); semantic web technologies (to harness the internet for 
actionable intelligence and to support decision-making); autonomous self-organised 
networks of smart sensors (to build a comprehensive picture of an operating 
environment); and energy storage and distribution (e.g. miniaturised energy sources).54 
This adds a valuable forward-leaning perspective to the potential R&T agenda, which is 
necessary for preventing strategic surprises and for gaining the technological edge in a 
dynamic threat and risk environment. At a more basic research level, it also provides for 
the inter-agency approach to ‘technologies whose applications for either civil security or 
defence are still unknown.’55 
36. The ECORYS study focused on identifying the areas in which technology synergy 
between the civil security and defence sectors have been most frequent till now or 
where the potential of such spin-offs is deemed most promising by the experts. The 
paper concluded that these were, almost invariably, the areas of sensor technologies, C3 
(Command, Control and Communications) and cyber security.56 In addition, the study 
pointed out that joint R&T activities performed by civil security and defence 
organisations is one of the facilitating factors for future spin-offs and spin-ins (along with 
similar operational needs, technology maturity level and market characteristics). It 
allows both military and civil security end-users discuss their needs and requirements at 
an early stage and it helps to develop a culture of working together. According to the 
study’s findings, joint R&D efforts across European countries were concentrated, yet 
again, in the fields of C3 and cyber security as well as in space and CBRN-E protection 
technologies.57 
37. The EC and EDA have formally agreed within the European Framework 
Agreement to pursue CBRN protection as a ‘mature research topic’ to co-operate on. 
                                                 
53 IAI, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and IRIS, pp. 78–81. 
54 Ibid, pp. 84–86. 
55 See European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, News, March 2013. 
56 See ECORYS, p. 75. 
57 Ibid, p. 74. 
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The two organisations have also declared their intention to add the topics of UASs and 
situational awareness (including sensors, information management and cyber security) 
to this agenda in the future.58 They have also previously co-ordinated their activities in 
underwater research and explosives’ detection technologies.59 EDA and ESA have of 
their own accord agreed to co-operate in the fields of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance), satellite communication (in support of UASs), Earth observation, space 
situational awareness and critical space technologies for European non-dependence.60 
38. After performing an analysis of Priority Shortfall Areas in the Alliance’s 
capabilities, NATO Allied Command Transformation has identified a set of R&T 
objectives in those areas. Although the analysis clearly kept military applications in 
mind, it can be argued that the results of R&T efforts in those areas would be highly 
relevant to civil security and public safety end-users. These include: 
 Novel training systems, techniques, tools, technologies, strategies and 
organisation; 
 Language translation technologies and training; 
 Non-kinetic effects in the human environment and information domain 
(protection and consequences management); 
 Kinetic effects of ballistic missiles, CBRN-E, Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) and natural and man-made disasters (protection and consequences 
management); 
 Situational awareness (intelligence) in all domains and information sharing; 
 Collaboration culture and expertise management; 
 Adaptive systems and capabilities; 
 Energy consumption efficiency; 
 Low-cost autonomous solutions (platforms, sensors, effectors and system 
integration).61 
39.  Individual nations pursue dual-use R&T within a rather narrow circle of themes 
(which are difficult to compare due to major differences in levels of detail available 
about particular technologies of interest).62 
39.1 In the Netherlands, defence, security and safety R&T has five focus 
areas: (1) Observation Systems (radar and electronic defence, electro-optics and 
sonars); (2) Information and Operations (operational analysis, purchase and 
exploitation; Modelling, Simulation and Gaming; Network Enabled Capabilities; 
and surveillance, maintenance and training); (3) Protection, Munitions and 
Weapons (weapons systems, personal protection and survivability, high 
performance energetics); (4) CBRN-E Protection (threat and protection, chemical 
and biological detection, identification, diagnosis and therapy, physical 
protection and tests); and (5) Human Factors (intelligent interfaces, perception 
and simulation, human in command, human performance, traffic behaviour, 
training and instruction).63 Although some R&T elements mainly support 
defence or civil security applications, the use of the integrated approach means 
                                                 
58 See European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, News, 20 September 2011. 
59 See European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, News, March 2013. 
60 European Defence Agency, “EDA and Space,” EDA Factsheet, 17 June 2011, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet_-Defence_space_final.pdf. 
61 NATO Allied Command Transformation, “From PSAs to S&T Objectives,” presentation in the possession of the authors. 
62 The ECORYS and the IAI, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and IRIS studies covered a number of EU member 
states, some of which are also listed in this paragraph. 
63 See Keuning, 2010. 
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that benefits flow in both directions (from defence to civil security and from civil 
security to defence). Examples of defence spin-offs to civil security include 
extending new knowledge about soldier effectiveness to the functioning of first 
responders; using the design of combat operations centres to design security 
and safety control rooms; and applying knowledge about explosives detection 
techniques. Civil security research also benefits the military, the examples being: 
public area camera surveillance in urban operations; new materials in compound 
and vehicle protection; new communication technologies in the protection of 
military C3 networks; sensor concepts in military UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) 
and space applications; and fireworks safety research helping to improve 
munitions storage.64 
 
39.2 Finland’s examples of dual-use (or multi-use, as is the preferred term in 
Finland) R&T and capability development investments include C3 (VIRVE TETRA-
radio communications for all homeland security actors; Software Defined Radio), 
situational awareness (the Maritime Environment Tri-Authority Operations 
system) and information management projects. Potentially, UASs could be 
added to these, although presently only the military can purchase, own and 
operate them.65 In addition, the Scientific Advisory Board for Defence (MATINE) 
funds projects at TRL 1-2 the outcomes of which can be applied in civil security 
or public safety. The areas include: sensors and environment; electronics; 
software and telecommunications; materials and production; machine building 
and structures; system analysis; CBRN and medicine; social sciences; health and 
human factors.66 
 
39.3 Norway’s examples of harnessing defence research and technology 
expertise (concentrated mainly in its Defence Research Establishment (FFI)) for 
civil security and safety purposes include: CBRN; Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (vulnerability assessments for the telecommunications, energy and 
transport sectors; critical information systems protection); Crisis Management 
(including scenarios and emergency preparedness assessments); and space 
technology for Earth observation.67 However, FFI’s R&T competences in such 
areas as information management (e.g. C3, modelling and simulation), air 
systems (e.g. UAVs), maritime systems (e.g. unmanned undersea vehicles, 
sonars, undersea surveillance and surveying the marine environment) and 
protection technologies (e.g. environmental and physical protection) could 
equally be exploited for civil security and safety objectives. 
 
39.4 In Ireland, it is not definitively clear whether or not the results of R&T 
projects are largely dual-use or not (“we are ‘agnostic’ in this regard”, as the 
interviewee put it), as the respective decisions are mostly driven by 
opportunities in civil security or defence markets and the availability of EU 
funding. However, the projects undertaken usually reflect the inherent strengths 
of the country’s research and industry base (mainly information and 
communication technology (ICT)) and the expertise of end-users (e.g. CBRN-E, 
especially explosives). Technologies that make it possible to tap social media for 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Hyytiäinen, 2013. 
66
 Presentation by Pekka Appelqvist, Secretary General of MATINE (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence), 3 June 2013. 
67 Paul Narum, “Defence and Security R&T in Norway,” Seminar Presentation, Tallinn: Academy of Sciences, 20 September 
2010, http://icds.ee/fileadmin/events/2010-09-20-interagency/Dr%20Paul%20Narum-Director%20General-FFI.pdf. 
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intelligence data gathering have also been flagged as being of interest to civil 
security and defence end-users.68 
 
39.5 Slovenia’s potential for dual-use R&T is mostly concentrated in fields 
that have received the largest amount of national and international support and 
that represent the country’s scientific and technological strengths. These lie in 
machine engineering, micro- and nanotechnologies, ICT and biotechnology.69  
 
39.6 Across the Atlantic, Canada’s inter-agency defence, security and safety 
R&T agenda encompasses four themes: (1) CBRN-E; (2) Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, including vulnerability assessments and monitoring, resilience, 
disaster alert and mitigation and cyber security; (3) Surveillance, Intelligence and 
Interdiction (SII), including integrated communications, intelligence and 
surveillance, maritime/border/transportation SII and forensics; and (4) 
Emergency Management Systems and Interoperability, including risk and 
vulnerability assessments, interoperability, standards, modelling and decision 
support and human factors.70 
40. We have analysed a number of policy documents that govern Estonia’s national 
security and defence, including the National Security Concept (2010), the National 
Defence Strategy (2010), the Main Guidelines of Estonia’s Security Policy until 2015 
(including implementation reports), the Cyber Security Strategy (2008) and the 
Fundamentals of Counter-Terrorism in Estonia (2006). Although none of them explicitly 
refers to specific priority areas of R&T, they still contain a number of clues about 
scientific knowledge and technology of relevance to various national security objectives 
and functions.71 We have derived the following areas in which civil security, public safety 
and national defence end-users could have shared interests in Estonia: 
 Command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I) 
devices, systems and networks, their integration/interoperability and 
protection/security (cyber security); 
 
 Surveillance devices, platforms, systems and their integration for 
maritime/air/land(area)/point monitoring and object detection, localisation, 
identification and tracking; 
 
 Crisis/emergency modelling, simulation, gaming and training, software 
solutions, data collection and management, human-machine interfaces, etc.; 
 
 CBRN-E, especially the ‘C’, ‘R’ and ‘E’ parts of it, for substance monitoring, 
detection, analysis and decontamination/neutralisation; 
 
 Physical protection of personnel and infrastructure; 
 
 Human factors – physical, mental and psychological performance and 
resilience, behavioural science and sociology, organisational behaviour and 
management, human source intelligence gathering, social networks, etc.; 
 
                                                 
68 Murphy, 2013. 
69 Kozmus, 2013. 
70 Walker, 2010. 
71 Most of these documents come up for review in 2013–2014. It is, however, quite unlikely that this will lead to the 
inclusion of more coherent and elaborate principles on technology policy or R&T priorities. In our view, it is also unlikely 
that these reviews will radically alter our analysis of the directions and areas of (dual-use) R&T.  
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 Risk assessment and management, resource and capability planning 
methodologies. 
41. As we have pointed out earlier, the EASS is one of the very few genuinely inter-
agency hubs for education, training, research and technology in Estonia.72 It has set out 
to advance its R&T competence in a number of areas, some of which could also be of 
relevance to defence end-users, such as:  
 Crisis management; 
 Preventive surveys, high-risk behaviour and information measures; 
 Risk management and civil defence; 
 Effectiveness of in-service training; 
 Financing models and resource planning; 
 Innovative educational techniques; 
 Development of professional terminology and language technology; 
 Development of human resources and personnel management.73 
42. Safety and security (prevention of emergencies, crisis management and 
communication, maritime safety and the protection of citizens) constitute one of the 
key priorities of Estonian space policy.74 Although the MOI has been tasked with leading 
the development of applications to address this priority, defence end-users could 
benefit from them as well. Such applications will most likely concentrate in three areas: 
 Surveillance, monitoring and geo-information (related to the Earth 
observation initiative ‘Global Monitoring for Environment and Security’, 
which has a security and defence dimension); 
 Positioning, localisation, tracking and navigation (related to the forthcoming 
European satellite navigation and positioning system ‘Galileo’ and 
associated functions aimed at improving the accuracy of positioning 
systems); 
 Access to and use of meteorological information (related to the services 
provided by the EUMETSAT via the Estonian Meteorological and 
Hydrological Institute).  
43. The Estonian MOD’s Research Council has produced a rather extensive list of 
technological competences of interest to defence (including a total of 35 competences). 
These are grouped into three larger areas: (1) situational awareness, systems, system 
integration, information management (including information assurance) and decision-
making; (2) force protection and sustainment; and (3) human factors and medicine.75 It 
is planned to formally identify these areas in the new defence research and 
development strategy as priorities and as specialist niches within NATO and the EU, with 
a strong emphasis on the dual-use principle. These three broad areas and the 
technological competences within them evidently include what we have derived from 
                                                 
72 The EASS educates and trains police, border guard and rescue personnel (who work for agencies under the MOI), 
customs personnel (under the Ministry of Finance) and prison services personnel (under the Ministry of Justice). In the 
early 1990s, it was called the State Defence Academy and thus it also offered training to military officers. 
73 See Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, Research, Development and Innovation Strategy of the Estonian Academy of 
Security Sciences till 2015 (in Estonian), 4 March 2013, p. 3, http://sisekaitse.ee/public/Teadus-
_ja_arendus/SKA_TAL_strateegia_kinnitatud.pdf. 
74 See Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Strategy for Estonian Space Affairs 2011–2013, 2012, p. 21, 
http://www.eas.ee/images/doc/ettevotjale/innovatsioon/kosmos/estonian-space-strategy-2011-2013-booklet.pdf. 
75 Jermalavičius, pp. 25–26. 
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the national security and defence policy documents and listed in the previous 
paragraph. 
44. Our survey tested to what extent civil security and safety organisations are keen 
on those technology competences that are of interest to defence. Although imperfect 
(and revealing a rather techno-centric attitude that focuses on hard sciences), the 
results still give us an indication of the convergence points between the interests of end-
users in the civil security and safety sectors and in defence organisations. Having 
received the highest grades for current and future relevance and the highest number of 
‘hits’ from the respondents, the top five technology competences are: 
 Sensors (radio-frequency, optical, sounder, pressure, seismic, magnetic, 
electrical, chemical and biological); 
 Radars; 
 Sensor networks, cognitive signal processing and data fusion; 
 Communication systems (including their interoperability); 
 Network-enabled capabilities. 
45. Many past and current R&T projects funded by the MOD – the ministry with the 
most advanced policy and record of R&T investments – are of a dual-use character. 
Indeed, the results of those investments have already been successfully deployed for 
civil security and safety uses (e.g. sensors for border surveillance, jammers for 
countering IEDs and simulation software for defence against cyber attacks). 
Furthermore, the MOD remains very positive about the use of the results of other past 
projects by other ministries and agencies. In our view, there are numerous past projects 
that could yield new knowledge and technology useful not only for defence but also for 
civil security and safety end-users. These projects involve: 
 A universal Unmanned Ground Vehicle; 
 An UAV; 
 A portable analyser of chemical agents; 
 Protection against radiation; 
 Adaptive camouflage; 
 Light armour panels for transportation vehicles; 
 UAV observation data processing; 
 Network-based capabilities and spontaneous networks; 
 Radio communication technology; 
 A digital radar; 
 GPS (Global Positioning System) usage for obtaining meteorological data; 
 Personnel performance in chronic heat conditions; 
 Psychological tests for personnel selection.76 
46. Finally, our interviews with experts and planners, together with the expert 
workshop, re-affirmed that there are overlapping interests in C4I, surveillance, sensor, 
cyber security, CBRN-E, modelling and simulation technologies. It also transpired that 
civil security, safety and defence end-users shared interests in new knowledge, 
technology and applications related to the use of UAVs (e.g. enabling their introduction 
into managed airspace) and space-based assets (e.g. in geo-information systems). As 
one workshop participant noted, ‘space technology is inherently dual-use.’ Last but not 
least, a less techno-centric side of the end-user community emerged, with indications of 
                                                 
76 The full list of the MOD’s past R&T projects is available in Jermalavičius, pp. 23–24. It should be noted that even 
projects with very clear military applications (e.g. assessing the soil crossing ability of heavy military vehicles) could have 
yielded knowledge relevant to civilian users as well, although this might not always be evident straight away. 
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a strong shared interest in human factors, in methodologies for supporting better 
planning and decision-making (e.g. resource and capability planning, foresight, risk and 
impact assessment, system and operational analysis) and in novel approaches to training 
and education. 
 
IV. Business models 
47. There are a number of different business models for implementing dual-use 
R&T, the choice and details of which depend on ambition and context. In their pure 
form, the models could be divided into four broad (and somewhat overlapping) 
categories: 
47.1  A fully integrated business model for civil security, safety and defence 
R&T presupposes that end-user organisations do not conduct their own 
(stovepiped) R&T at all and totally rely on joint R&T strategies and roadmaps; on 
joint planning, decision-making and funding structures and processes; and on a 
common knowledge and/or innovation brokering hub. We did not find any 
examples that reflected this ideal in its entirety, but several countries came 
quite close through partial integration. For instance: 
47.1.1 In the Netherlands, the MOD, the Ministry of Justice and the 
MOI draw up common knowledge requirements and channel them – 
together with the required funding – to the specialised defence, security 
and safety arm of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific 
Research (TNO). However, every ministry still has its own knowledge 
needs which it may address either through TNO (and not necessarily 
through its defence, security and safety division) or by sourcing from 
other (even non-Dutch) knowledge suppliers.77 
 
47.1.2 In the UK, the defence and home affairs departments use the 
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Reviews as 
a basis for a common policy on technology, equipment and support. 
Again, this does not exclude individual approaches if their capability 
needs diverge, but the aspiration is to jointly build, support and exploit 
the national knowledge and industrial base for defence and security 
purposes, with a ministerial working group ensuring adherence to the 
whole-of-government approach at the policy level. There has also been 
some progress towards integrated implementation (e.g. by extending 
the remit of the Centre for Defence Enterprise – the innovation 
brokering hub for defence – to security technology and industry).78 
 
47.1.3 In Poland, security and defence R&T activities are integrated 
through the National Science Council (up to TRL3) and the National 
Research and Development Council (TRL4 to TRL9) under the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education. The Ministry of National Defence and 
other ministries (and industry representatives) participate in the 
steering committees of the councils which run the so-called national 
projects. Instead of advancing stovepiped agendas (even though 
institutional projects are still possible and pursued to address purely 
defence-related needs), institutional R&T strategies (e.g. that of the 
                                                 
77 See Tomas Jermalavičius, “Defence R&D: Lessons from NATO Allies,” ICDS Report, 2009, 
http://icds.ee/fileadmin/failid/Report-Defence_R_D-Lessons_from_NATO_allies.pdf. 
78 See UK Ministry of Defence, 2012. 
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Ministry of National Defence) aim to ensure that institutional needs are 
properly reflected in national projects, that co-operation with the 
leading ministry (the Ministry of Science and Higher Education) is 
appropriate and that international co-operation (e.g. in EDA and NATO 
projects) is intensive.79  
47.2 A collaborative model presupposes that organisations draft their own 
institutional R&T strategies and roadmaps which are implemented through 
separate (often in-house) knowledge brokering hubs (R&T institutes, 
laboratories and centres). However, the organisations come together to issue 
common requirements and pool resources for joint projects when inter-agency 
imperatives are very strong or when a national security strategy requires their 
close operational collaboration (or when the critical mass needed for the 
implementation of an R&T project has to be achieved). It is also quite common 
to cluster different knowledge brokering hubs (together with business 
enterprises) at the same location in order to facilitate their interaction. 
Collaboration may be temporary and ad hoc (i.e. it occurs whenever 
opportunities are spotted by the two sides in any field of interest, leading to co-
operation for a limited period) or it may be more structured, even with elements 
of partial integration (i.e. it focuses on particular areas of R&T over a longer 
period). In our view, this model is best illustrated by Finland.  
47.3 A business model focused on the co-ordination of separate institutional 
R&T strategies presupposes constant comparison and harmonisation of 
institutional needs, plans and roadmaps of defence, civil security and safety end-
users, together with the definition of common standards in selected areas. The 
aim of such activities is to avoid the duplication of investments, the issuing of 
conflicting requirements to the same suppliers and the development of 
incompatible solutions for similar functions of different agencies. This is a 
rationalised form of stovepiping – one which allows an organisation to benefit 
from the expertise and results of its sister organisations, while maintaining an 
independent R&T agenda to serve its own needs. Although European 
organisations – the EC, EDA and ESA – have introduced elements of a more 
collaborative approach, they are mostly confined to the co-ordination and 
harmonisation of their activities (mainly due to various idiosyncrasies found at 
the European level of co-operation and in their institutional make-up). 
47.4 Finally, at the opposite end of the co-operation spectrum from full 
integration, there are business models that primarily focus on awareness and 
exchange. Their choice could be determined, for instance, by reluctance to carry 
the additional administrative burden associated with closer inter-agency co-
operation in R&T, by the lack of a cooperation tradition or by a heavy 
dominance of one organisation (e.g. defence) in terms of its R&T investments, 
the scope of its agenda and its experience with R&T matters. This model, 
however, implies readiness and ability to spin-in/spin-off R&T results and 
competences for further use (adaptation) in separate sectors (which, in turn, 
pre-supposes a degree of openness to such exchanges, including in intellectual 
property rights management and information protection requirements). In our 
opinion, Norway practices a version of this model.  
48. It seems reasonable that elements of these four models can coexist at the same 
time in the inter-agency approach to defence, security and safety R&T. For instance, a 
joint (integrated) R&T strategy and roadmap may be drawn up only for a select area of 
                                                 
79 See Kalbarczyk, 2010. 
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blurred functions (e.g. crisis and emergency management) or for a knowledge and 
technology area with the highest degree of common interest (e.g. cyber security), while 
other activities mostly concentrate on co-ordination or even simply maintaining 
awareness. In a similar vein, the co-ordination model may include projects of a 
collaborative nature, particularly when it turns out that end-user requirements are 
largely the same or when scarce financial resources can, and must, be pooled together. 
Last but not least, the integrated model might dominate at lower TRLs, while 
collaborative or co-ordinated approaches could be dominant at higher TRLs (and, vice 
versa, the integrated model might be applied to new product or service development on 
the basis of largely institutional R&T programmes). 
49.  In Estonia, the integrated approach is built into the design of the so-called 
national research and development programmes – a mechanism established by the 
Organisation of Research and Development Act. The criteria for launching these 
programmes include the following requirements: the multidisciplinary nature of 
activities, the involvement of several ministries and linkages with the national research, 
development and innovation strategy. So far, national research and development 
programmes for ICT, biotechnology, energy, the environment and health, together with 
a provisional one for materials technology, have been launched. Although the 
integration of the R&T interests of various security, safety and defence stakeholders by 
means of a dedicated national programme sounds logical and natural, such programme 
does not yet exist. 
50. Our conversations with the managers of some national research and 
development programmes were quite informative as to what issues should be 
addressed for an integrated security, safety and defence programme to succeed: 
50.1  Planning: Participating ministries and agencies have to be good at joint 
planning from defining their common objectives and requirements to producing 
a sufficiently detailed, specific and measurable technology roadmap. As we 
highlighted earlier, Estonian defence and civil security organisations do not have 
a very positive record in this respect. 
 
50.2 Focus: The chances of success increase if a programme does not have 
more than two or three clear directions.80 The findings presented in Chapter III 
provide a basis for agreeing on such directions in security, safety and defence 
sector. However, not all themes relevant to this sector can be woven together 
into a coherent national programme. 
 
50.3 Funding: Sufficient funding from participating ministries and the EU is 
what draws the attention, and ensures the eager participation, of public R&T 
organisations and the industry. Given that R&T spending levels of the civil 
security and defence sectors taken together are rather negligible in absolute 
terms (or even non-existent in some agencies), it is almost impossible to meet 
this requirement at the present, especially without any EU funding.   
 
50.4 Political/policy level support: A national programme has to receive 
sustained attention and support from the political/policy-making level. As we 
pointed out earlier, the political level is often supportive of the dual-use R&T 
idea, but the problem lies with generalist policy-makers. It may be easy to 
generate a sufficient degree of attention and to gain backing for the themes 
                                                 
80 The same advice – to seek a clear focus – comes from countries with considerable experience with dual-use R&T (for 
instance, Italy). See Esposito, 2010. 
  
Dual-use R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius and Mikk Lellsaar 
 
 
23 
which are currently in vogue such as cyber security. However, it is difficult to 
elicit the same degree of support to equally significant but less popular and 
appreciated areas of knowledge, technology and innovation in security and 
defence (e.g. sensorics or human factors). 
 
50.5 Governance and administrative capacity: There is a need for sufficient 
numbers of qualified people to provide robust programme oversight and 
administration. The MOD has only two full-time R&T managers, the MOI does 
not have a central R&T co-ordinator and the MEAC does not have an R&T expert 
for the security and safety part of its portfolio of responsibilities, so this capacity 
is extremely limited at the ministerial level. The picture is similar at the level of 
subordinate agencies. 
 
50.6 Leading ministry: The business model suitable for national research and 
development programmes requires one ministry to lead, with overall 
programme responsibility and the involvement of other stakeholders. The 
experience, resources and relative sophistication of its R&T policy suggest that 
the Estonian MOD is suitable for taking this role in an integrated security, safety 
and defence R&T programme. However, the circle of civil security and safety 
end-users is broader; their knowledge and technology needs are more 
immediate; they have access to EU funds (which is not the case with the MOD, 
as defence organisations are excluded from EU financing); they also possess 
experience with EU-funded projects and/or the management of existing national 
research and development programmes (in addition, the MEAC can channel 
results of R&T projects through enterprise innovation support mechanisms). This 
seems to favour a non-defence ministry in the lead, but it comes with a 
significant risk of increasing the distance between R&T and military end-users 
(which runs counter to the MOD’s policy and efforts).  
51. Another possibility related to the integrated approach is to insert joint defence 
and civil security end-user requirements into existing national research and 
development programmes. This would be in line with the reality that civil security and 
defence R&T in Estonia exploits the same civilian R&T base. The managers of existing 
programmes are quite positive about this; but, as it transpired during the workshop, the 
governance framework of the programmes would have to be altered to allow this – 
especially as the MOD and the MOI currently do not contribute their own funds to 
support the fulfilment of their interests through existing national programmes. 
52. As mentioned earlier, there are some examples of ad hoc collaborative 
approaches displayed by security and defence actors in R&T. In one particular case, end-
users from the national defence and border guard authorities came together to 
formulate and communicate their needs to the scientists of Tallinn University of 
Technology who participated in the EU-funded project consortium on underwater 
acoustics monitoring (BIAS LIFE). In a similar vein, experts from civil security and safety 
organisations (e.g. the Estonian Information System’s Authority and SMIT) have 
participated in some projects and events conducted by the NATO Science and 
Technology Organisation thanks to the support of the MOD. However, even such ad hoc 
collaboration – which suits civilian agencies very well given that they mainly invest in 
R&T on a case-by-case basis – is the exception rather than the rule. It is hampered by 
the lack of communication between the ministries and their subordinate agencies about 
their intentions for new projects and by the absence of clear points of contact (POCs) on 
R&T issues on the side of civil security and safety organisations. 
52.1 The adoption of the Estonian Defence Industrial Policy 2013–2022 might 
lay the ground for more ad hoc collaboration on various projects. The policy 
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envisages that a committee of stakeholders will deliberate over ideas and 
project proposals coming from enterprises. However, this mostly pertains to 
projects at higher TRLs (i.e. new product or service development and 
introduction) rather than lower TRLs (i.e. R&T). 
53. Opportunities for more structured long-term collaboration are emerging after 
the adoption of the new R&D strategy of the EASS. With its areas of interest clearly 
articulated, it is becoming possible to engage a sister organisation on the defence side – 
the ENDC – to collaborate on the development of new knowledge and in-house 
competence in areas where defence, civil security and public safety issues strongly 
overlap (but do not necessarily or immediately lead to commercial development 
opportunities) and to support the training and education missions of the two 
organisations. However, research capacities and ambitions are very limited which 
presents significant difficulties for structured collaboration to take off and be sustained 
in this format. 
54. R&T co-ordination between civil security, safety and defence organisations in 
Estonia is provided in an ad hoc fashion at best, but usually it is absent. This is despite 
the government’s legal obligation to assume a formal role as a co-ordinating 
organisation for all institutional research and development programmes – civil security 
and defence representatives have only recently been included in the MER-led working 
group for renewing the national R&D and Innovation Strategy (“Knowledge-Based 
Estonia”). One reason for this is, of course, that the majority of actors on the civilian side 
of demand do not have any policies, strategies or roadmaps that can be co-ordinated or 
harmonised with the defence side in the first place. (Our workshop also revealed that 
agencies on the civilian side do not co-ordinate much between themselves either due 
the very same policy vacuum and the MOI’s and the MEAC’s failure to play a co-
ordinating role in R&T matters in relation to their own subordinate agencies.) The other 
reason is that many civilian organisations have treated defence as a completely separate 
sector which has too specific requirements and which is excessively oriented towards its 
war-fighting mission (a perception often reinforced by the EDF itself) and therefore 
bears little relevance to civil security and public safety needs. 
55. The workshop participants also highlighted the following issues that prevent 
R&T co-ordination: 
55.1 The inability of end-users to formulate effective and meaningful R&T 
requirements tailored to broader policies, capability requirements and 
operational needs; 
 
55.2 The defence side’s unwillingness to share classified capability 
requirements and development plans with governmental civil security 
organisations, let alone R&T suppliers; 
 
55.3 The absence of central POCs for R&T issues on the civil security and 
public safety side in the MOI and MEAC spheres of governance (also in other 
organisations, e.g. the MOF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.); 
 
55.4 No interest from, and the lack of a defined role for, the State Chancellery 
in co-ordinating security-related R&T issues (even though the government meets 
in the Security Committee and R&D Committee formats, both of which are 
supported by the State Chancellery). 
56. At the moment, awareness building about the R&T activities of defence, civil 
security and safety organisations in Estonia is quite sporadic, without a defined, 
constantly sustained and periodically updated set of measures. There have been spin-
  
Dual-use R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius and Mikk Lellsaar 
 
 
25 
offs from defence-related projects to civil security uses, but these have been quite 
accidental, resulting from the initiative and efforts of the supply side. Towering over 
other civil security and safety organisations with its R&T agenda and portfolio, the MOD 
has a special role to play in building inter-agency awareness and it has indeed been 
increasingly active in this regard. However, its administrative capacity is often 
overwhelmed by intra-organisational challenges and international co-operation 
demands, while opportunities for inter-agency awareness building are too few and far 
between. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
57. There are strong strategic, operational, financial and organisational reasons for 
civil security, public safety and national defence organisations to co-operate in R&T. The 
nature of contemporary security and defence is such that organisational silos stand in 
the way of effective whole-of-government and whole-of-society responses to the 
complex and dynamic threat and risk environment. The very limited financial and human 
resources of a small nation such as Estonia further contribute to weighty arguments for 
avoiding duplication, pursuing synergy and developing the inter-agency approach to the 
entire value chain of civil security, public safety and defence organisations – from joint 
foresight, risk and threat assessment, lessons learned, concept development and 
experimentation (CD&E) and R&T to common development of new 
services/applications, their testing and evaluation,  joint procurement, maintenance and 
operations as well as education and training. It is quite difficult to build comprehensive 
security and broad-based defence without the inter-agency approach, including in R&T. 
58. Our civil security, public safety and national defence organisations have to co-
operate to fulfil their often blurred tasks and missions – especially when dealing with 
large-scale emergencies, but also in routine daily operations – or, at least, to act as 
intelligent customers for each other’s services. Their technical and human 
interoperability has to be high, especially in systems and skill-sets which enable 
operational co-operation. Indeed, there are many examples that show they are quite 
successful at such operational co-operation in Estonia. What is lacking here is the 
culture, practice and framework for inter-agency risk analysis, capability planning, 
concept development and, by extension, the ability to formulate and manage common 
knowledge and technology requirements and to invest in dual-use R&T through a 
common effort. Dual-use R&T – an issue of growing importance at the European level 
and in other nations – or even R&T as such is simply missing from comprehensive 
security and broad-based defence thinking and practice in Estonia. 
59. European and national practices as well as our take on Estonia’s security policies 
and Estonian expert perspectives show that dual-use R&T – one of the enabling 
conditions for synergy between military, civil security and public safety sectors – has a 
rather defined set of themes. The most recurrent ones are situational awareness (a full 
variety of sensor technologies, their networks and integration); information 
management (C4I, cyber security, network-enabled capabilities, social media 
exploitation, etc.); physical protection; CBRN-E detection and protection; unmanned 
aerial, ground and undersea platforms and systems; space technology; and decision-
making support (modelling and simulation, risk assessment, resource planning 
methodologies, etc.). We would also strongly argue that R&T in human factors and 
medicine (physical, cognitive and mental performance, behavioural and sociological 
research, medical research, etc.) is inherently dual-use and is exploited by civil security 
and safety as well as military organisations. 
60. Co-operation on these themes ranges from awareness building and the 
exchange of results to co-ordination, collaboration and integration. National and 
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institutional contexts and levels of ambition determine which business models or 
combinations thereof are accepted in a particular country or even internationally (e.g. at 
the European level). Despite the Estonian government’s formal obligation to ensure the 
co-ordination of institutional research and development programmes, there is not much 
co-ordination – indeed, there is even little mutual awareness, not to speak of 
collaboration and integration – between civil security, safety and defence organisations 
in their R&T investments. In terms of synergy, all achievements – mainly in the form of 
spin-offs from the defence sector’s past investments – have been largely due to the 
supply side’s initiative. 
61. At the moment, the business models described above are not suitable for 
Estonia in their pure form, even though some tentative steps are being made towards, 
and initial conditions are emerging for, more co-ordinated and collaborative 
approaches. However, as a small nation, Estonia can ill-afford to thinly spread its 
financial, material, human and intellectual resources in civil security, public safety and 
national defence. R&T is one of the areas where these resources could be consolidated – 
especially on the demand side – to achieve synergy, to save time and money, to increase 
national competence and its international impact and to lay the groundwork for future 
interoperable or shared solutions (applications).  
62. A fully integrated business model for inter-agency R&T activities (let alone for 
the entire value chain) is clearly unattainable, just as it is not present in its pure form 
elsewhere. On the other hand, partial integration, supplemented by collaborative, co-
ordinating and awareness building arrangements, is the right direction to go. It would 
take time and considerable effort to achieve, but it would produce multiple benefits for 
a comprehensive security and broad-based defence posture as well as for security and 
defence enterprise innovation (including better access to EU funding and knowledge 
networks). It might even catalyse greater inter-agency co-operation in other 
components of the value chain (such as foresight and risk analysis, concept development 
and experimentation or capability planning) of this particular set of public services – civil 
security, public safety and national defence.  
63. To advance the dual-use R&T principle in Estonia’s civil security, public safety 
and national defence, we recommend the following: 
63.1 Clearly define the role, strategic value, broad priorities and expected 
impact of R&T in the course of a security and defence review (updating the 
National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy, the Cyber Security 
Strategy, the Main Guidelines of Security Policy, the Fundamentals of Counter-
Terrorism, etc.); 
63.2 Develop an inter-agency capability planning methodology and process 
to effectively bring together different civil security, public safety and national 
defence organisations: 
63.2.1 The development of a comprehensive methodological toolbox, 
ideally covering the full value chain (from joint foresight, risk and threat 
assessment, lessons learned, concept development and experimentation 
(CD&E) and R&T to common development of new services/applications, 
their testing and evaluation,  joint procurement and maintenance, inter-
agency operations and education and training) would be an ambitious 
and complex, but eventually a very rewarding undertaking; 
63.2.2 Alternatively, the defence side should develop methods for 
including civil security and public safety organisations in their existing 
planning processes and, vice versa, for participating in the existing 
planning processes of the civilian authorities. This goal is less ambitious, 
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but still requires mutual familiarity with planning tools on the military 
and civilian sides as well as some common training and adjustment of 
organisational processes; 
63.3 In response to those strategic expectations (see the first point), produce 
a common knowledge, technology and innovation agenda and roadmap for the 
entire civil security, public safety and national defence sector as a separate 
capstone document or as an integral part of the national R&D and Innovation 
Strategy (‘Knowledge-Based Estonia’, or whatever its future iterations are going 
to be called). Merge, or at least link, the Estonian Defence Industrial Policy with 
this agenda; 
63.4 Establish a clear and legally binding budgetary benchmark for the 
ministries responsible for civil security, public safety and national defence 
regarding multi-annual investments in new knowledge, technology and 
innovation; 
63.5 Consider running regular joint sessions of the government’s Security 
Committee and its R&D Committee to provide general political guidance and 
oversight concerning common knowledge and the technology and innovation 
agenda of the civil security, public safety and national defence sector, with a 
concomitant role for the State Chancellery; 
63.6 Appoint POCs for R&T at the ministries and subordinate agencies 
dealing with civil security and public safety (including ministries not covered in 
this paper, e.g. the Ministries of Justice, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs). 
Institute regular meetings of POCs (including the existing defence side’s POCs) 
as a work format for dual-use R&T and inter-agency co-operation in this field; 
63.7 Develop an inter-disciplinary training programme for R&T co-
ordinators, capability developers, experts and policy generalists on the role, 
exploitation and impact of R&T in civil security, public safety and national 
defence, including on the methodologies for the definition of R&T requirements 
and on the translation of results into policy, conceptual, technical, 
organisational, operational or doctrinal innovation. Ideally, the programme 
should form part of the public service capacity development programme run by 
the State Chancellery and use the EASS as a platform for its organisation and 
delivery; 
63.8 In terms of an appropriate mix of business models for dual-use R&T (see 
summarised in Figure 2): 
63.8.1      As a basic awareness building measure, enhance 
communication about R&T needs, ideas, initiatives, projects and their 
outcomes between the ministries and their subordinate agencies that 
deal with civil security, public safety and national defence by means of 
mailing lists and newsletters, by opening meetings of the MOD Research 
Council for observers from other ministries and agencies, by inviting 
them to the EDF science days, etc.; 
63.8.2      Establish a regular and all-inclusive meeting forum (e.g. 
annual conference) for all stakeholders of dual-use R&T (both the 
demand and supply sides) in order to foster broad awareness of R&T 
and innovation developments and trends in the field of security, safety 
and defence;81 
                                                 
81 The seminar in 2010 and the workshop in 2013 demonstrated that such gatherings are very much appreciated by R&T 
experts, policymakers and R&T suppliers. 
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63.8.3      Consider launching a national research and development 
programme in civil security, public safety and national defence as a 
partial integration element of the mix, focusing on one or two 
knowledge and technology areas where interests of end-users are 
closely aligned. In our view, the key focus area for this measure should 
be (at least initially) situational awareness and information 
management technologies;82 
63.8.4      As another element of partial integration, jointly develop new 
knowledge and technology requirements of national defence, civil 
security and public safety end-users for some of the existing national 
research and development programmes. The health programme (e.g. to 
address requirements concerning cognitive, psychological and physical 
performance of personnel in extreme conditions, the prevention and 
treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, personnel rehabilitation, 
etc.) is the most obvious candidate. Other programmes (ICT, materials, 
energy and biotechnology) could also be considered: 
 Start a dialogue with the leading stakeholders of those 
programmes on the necessary arrangements and 
adjustments to enable the acceptance and fulfilment of 
joint requirements. 
63.8.5      As a collaborative element of the mix, advance close research 
collaboration between the EASS and the ENDC through a framework 
agreement and common projects. In particular, focus this collaboration 
on research on human and organisational factors (decision-making and 
leadership, personnel management, psychology and sociology, man-
machine interaction, organisational behaviour, etc.), modelling and 
simulation, innovative education and training methodologies and 
various comprehensive civil-military planning methodologies (e.g. risk 
assessment, strategy, foresight, resource planning, crisis management, 
etc.): 
 Commit and adequately fund the two organisations to 
enhance their in-house research capacities, so that they 
could better serve their end-users and more effectively 
engage in collaboration; 
63.8.6      Use the inter-ministerial and inter-agency expert group 
(recommended above) as an instrument to co-ordinate institutional R&T 
initiatives and activities in unmanned systems and platforms, CBRN-E 
defence, physical personnel and infrastructure protection technologies 
and space technology. This kind of co-ordination would help avoid the 
duplication of investments and interoperability problems, while creating 
opportunities for commonly funded (ad hoc collaborative) projects: 
 
                                                 
82 C4I devices, systems and networks, their integration/interoperability and protection/security (cyber security), data 
fusion, etc.; surveillance and signal processing devices, platforms, systems (including space-based) and their integration 
for maritime/air/land(area)/point monitoring and object detection, localisation, identification and tracking. 
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Figure 2: The recommended mix of business models for Estonia’s dual-use R&T 
 
